美国战略和预算评估中心-更多相同的？俄罗斯军队的未来及其变革能力（英）-2024.3.docx

《美国战略和预算评估中心-更多相同的？俄罗斯军队的未来及其变革能力（英）-2024.3.docx》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《美国战略和预算评估中心-更多相同的？俄罗斯军队的未来及其变革能力（英）-2024.3.docx（84页珍藏版）》请在优知文库上搜索。

1、Crutrrf11rStraUicH1.dBMl11hryAjekuwi心MOREOFTHESAME?THEFUTUREOFTHERUSSIANMI1.ITARYANDITSABI1.ITYTOCHANGEKATHERINEKJE1.1.STROME1.GINMoreofthesame?THEFUTUREOFTHERUSSIANMI1.ITARYANDITSABI1.ITYTOCHANGEKATHERINEKJE1.1.STROME1.GINCSBACimUrKrtndee*ndDnHarvkstxmntUn2024ABOUTTHECENTERFORSTRATEGICANDBUDGETARYA

2、SSESSMENTS(CSBA)TheCenterforStrategicandBudgetaryAssessmentsisanindependent,nonpartisanpolicyresearchinstituteestablishedtopromoteinnovativethinkinganddebateaboutnationalsecuritystrategyandinvestmentoptions.CSBA,sanalysisfocusesonkeyquestionsrelatedtoexistingandemergingthreatstoU.S.nationalsecurity,

3、anditsgoalistoenablepolicymakerstomakeinformeddecisionsonmattersofstrategy,securitypolicy,andresourceallocation.2024CenterforStrategicandBudgetaryAssessments.Allrightsreserved.ABOUTTHEAUTHORDr.KatherineKjellstromElginisaFellowattheCenterforStrategicandBudgetaryAssessments.Shebringsrigorousresearchto

4、policydiscussionsandhasheldpositionsinbothacademicandpolicyorganizations.PriortojoiningCSBA,sheservedasaDAADPost-DoctoralFellowattheForeignPolicyInstituteofJohnsHopkinsSchoolofAdvancedInternationalStudies(SAIS).Dr.ElginhasalsoworkedattheBrookingsInstitutionandwiththe1.ongTermStrategyGroupinWashingto

5、n,D.C.In2018,sheservedasavisitingfellowattheInstituteforSecurity&DevelopmentPolicyinStockholm,Sweden.Dr.ElginearnedherPh.D.inPublicAffairs(SecurityStudies)fromPrincetonUniversitysSchoolofPublic&InternationalAffairs.AtPrinceton,sheservedasthedirectoroftheCenterforInternationalSecurityStudies1Strategi

6、cEducationInitiative,leadingtheuniversitysprogramforeducatingandmentoringstudentswithaninterestinnationalandinternationalsecurity.Dr.ElginalsoearnedherA.B.inPoliticsfromPrincetonUniversity.Dr.ElginspeaksFrench,Russian,andSwedish.ACKNOW1.EDGMENTSThisreportbenefitedfromthecontributionsofmany.Theauthor

7、wouldliketothankTimSadovforhissubstantialcontributionstohistoricalandRussian-languageresearchandJoeRoss,AlidaBlendonohy,ChrisRadcliffe,andMaryWatermanfortheirresearchsupport.ThomasC.MahnkenandEvanB.Montgomeryprovidedinvaluablefeedback,asdidothermembersoftheCSBAcommunity,includingEricEdelman,MichaelH

8、unzeker,TravisSharp,andJanvanTol.Theauthorwouldalsoliketothanktheparticipantsinaseriesofworkshopsthatsupportedtheproject,particularlyDimaAdamsky,aswellasthosewhoreviewedearlierversionsofthisreport.Finally,theauthorthanksEleanorShioriHughesandothersfortheireditingandpublicationsupport.Theanalysisandf

9、indingspresentedherearesolelytheresponsibilityoftheauthors.CSBAreceivesfundingfromabroadanddiversegroupofcontributors,includingprivatefoundations,governmentagencies,andcorporations.Acompletelistoftheseorganizationscanbefoundonourwebsiteatwww.csbaonline.org/about/contributors.Thispublicationwasfunded

10、bytheRussiaStrategicInitiative,U.S.EuropeanCommand.TheviewsexpressedinthispublicationdonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheDepartmentofDefenseortheUnitedStatesgovernment.ContentsEXECUTIVESUMMARYiMainFindingsiiRecommendationsivCHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION1TheProblem2CHAPTER 2: REFORMWITHRUSSIANCHARACTERIS

11、TICS9CharacteristicsoftheRussianMilitary10HowtheRussianMilitaryReforms23TendenciesofRussianReform30CHAPTER 3: AFRAMEWORKFORFORECASTINGRUSSIANREFORMAMBITIONANDSUCCESS35CHAPTER 4: THREECASESOFRUSSIANMI1.ITARYREFORMEFFORTS41TheMiliutinReforms42The1.ost1990s46TheNew1.ookReforms50Conclusions57CHAPTER 5:

12、IMP1.ICATIONSANDCONC1.USION61WhattheFutureHolds62ImplicationsfortheUnitedStatesanditsAllies65Recommendations68RevisitingPokazukhaReforms711.ISTOFACRONYMS74FIGURESFIGURE 1: THEASSESSEDORGANIZATIONANDCHAINOFCOMMANDOFTHERUSSIANMI1.ITARY14FIGURE 2: FEATURESOFANIDEA1.REFORMPROCESS24TAB1.ESTABLE 1: KEYORG

13、ANIZATIONA1.CHARACTERISTICSOFTHERUSSIANMI1.ITARY10TABLE 2: THEMESOFANIDEA1.REFORMPROCESS25TABLE 3: AFRAMEWORKOFRUSSIANMI1.ITARYREFORM37TABLE 4: REVISITINGTHEFRAMEWORKOFRUSSIANMI1.ITARYREFORM65ExecutiveSummaryAssessingthetypeofthreatthatRussiaislikelytoposeintheaftermathofthewarinUkraineisacriticalch

14、allengefortheUnitedStatesanditsallies.The2022NationalDefenseStrategy(NDS)describedRussiaasanacutethreat/5However,sincethereleaseoftheNDS,UkrainianforceshavecontinuedtoinflictseverecostsontheRussianmilitary,damagingRussianequipmentanddepletingRussianstockpiles.Meanwhile,theinternationalcommunityhasre

15、strictedRussia,saccesstoadvancedtechnology,inhibitingtheKremlin,sabilitytoreconstitute,andtheenlargementofNATOhasdramaticallyreshapedthethreatenvironmentthatMoscowfaces.Still,theRussianmilitarymaintainstheworld,slargestnucleararsenal,importantcomponentsofitsarmedforcesremainrelativelyuntouched,andth

16、eRussiangovernmentappearstocontinuetoharborrevisionistintentions.Giventhesedevelopments,whatWintheRussianmilitarylooklikeinthefuture?Twoschoolsofthoughtareemerging.ThefirstpostulatesthattheRussianmilitaryWinremainasignificantthreatandperhapsbecomeaverydifferentandevenmoreseriousone.ThisargumentholdsthattheRussianmilitaryWnlreconstituteinarel